

Exceptional service in the national interest

U.S. Public Perspectives on Nuclear Issues between 2011 and 2013

Public Engagement Commission on Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Seoul, ROK 18 April 2014

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University of Oklahoma and Sandia National Laboratories have created study center




- In 2006, University of Oklahoma started and has maintained a unique program for collection of national surveys of public perceptions on nuclear fuel cycle
- Sandia, through DOE and NRC, has been involved since early 1970s on technical issues related to the nuclear fuel cycle
 - Reactor safety
 - Transportation and storage
 - Lead laboratory on performance assessments for disposal of nuclear waste (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico and proposed Yucca Mountain repository in Nevada)
- Created joint center to study energy and security issues related to society



US public perspectives on nuclear issues between 2011 and 2013

- Nuclear energy in US context
 - Trend in support for nuclear energy
 - Implication of beliefs on climate change
 - US National public awareness of SNF cycle
 - Geologic disposal and interim storage
 - How options are presented matters
 - Implications of proximity
 - Desirable characteristics of storage and disposal
 - Institutional considerations and public engagement


Trend in attitudes about risk and acceptability of nuclear energy in US between 1973 and 2013




Sandia


Trend in preferred energy sources in US Trend in US

Nuclear energy still seen as important energy source in next
20 years, as measured since 2006





Index of Mean Support for New Nuclear Reactors



Take-away points



- Support for nuclear energy has eroded since 2010
 - But support remains for nuclear energy as part of overall energy mix
- Perceptions of nuclear energy risks have increased
 - Effects and implications of Fukushima still unfolding
- Greenhouse gases perceived to cause global climate change, but nuclear energy not seen as means to reduce them in US
 - Pervasive misunderstanding about nuclear generation producing greenhouse gases




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Awareness of current SNF management methods in 2011



What currently is being done with most US spent nuclear fuel?



Currently, spent nuclear fuel is being stored temporarily at > 100 sites in 39 states.

To the best of your knowledge, is spent nuclear fuel being stored above ground at any nuclear power plant within your state? (2011 responses)

<u>Correct</u>	Don't Know	Wrong
13%	59%	28%

Take-away points




- Public knowledge of SNF management lacking
 - US public unaware of need for new policies; thus, public susceptible to misinformation
- Therefore, opinion measurement requires special techniques
 - Must establish/share minimum level of crucial factual information
 - Must present balanced policy arguments to establish context
 - Public engagement must consider both *risk* and *benefit*
 - University of Oklahoma and others have found providing crucial factual information results in consistent and reliable assessments over time

What are the preferences of the US metalemetaries public related to repositories?

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Trend in support for current storage practices



Sandia


2013 Mean Support for Current Storage Practices

AGE	EDUCATION	<u>GENDER</u>	RACE/ <u>ETHNICITY</u>	INCOME	POLITICAL IDEOLOGY
18–29: 3.57	< Col Grad: 3.37	W: 3.34	Minorities: 3.40	< 50K: 3.37	Liberal: 3.21
30–49: 3.43	Col Grad: 3.53	M: 3.54	Majority: 3.46	50-100K: 3.46	Mod: 3.46
50+: 3.38				> 100K: 3.62	Consv: 3.65 12

Support for geologic repositories in 2011



Two underground mine-like repositories several thousand feet deep; one in east and one in west; secure surface storage buildings; option for retrieval or permanent storage; each meets all technical and safety requirements of federal and state regulatory agencies




Support for interim storage facility in 2013

Arguments FOR:

- Available much sooner
- Consolidates security
- Reduces on-site inventories
- Removes "stranded" fuel

Arguments AGAINST:


- Postpones long-term solution
- Adds transportation risks
- More costly
- No-harm from current practices



Influence of proximity on responses to questions

- How does assumed proximity to *new* consolidated interim SNF facilities influence support or opposition?
- Does living near an *existing* SNF temporary storage site condition acceptance of future consolidated interim sites near one's residence?

Proximity of respondents to temporary storage sites (primarily at reactors) in 2013



Estimates for Lower 48 Contiguous States:

76% of population (79% of 2013 respondents) reside within 100 miles of SNF 44% of population (46% of 2013 respondents) reside within 50 miles of SNF

If respondents learn how close they are to current storage, their response changed in 2012

MEANS: 1 = Strongly Oppose—7 = Strongly Support

Distance to <i>Current</i> SNF Storage	Repository 50 Miles Distant	Repository 100 Miles Distant	Repository 300 Miles Distant
Not shown (control)	3.55	3.96	4.26
Shown > 25 miles	3.56	3.90	4.33
Shown < 25 miles	3.89 (+.34)	4.79 (+.83)	4.71 (+.45)
Model <i>F</i> stat. sig.	Not Significant	<i>p</i> = 0.01	Not Significant

Distance to <i>Current</i> SNF Storage	Interim Storage 50 Miles Distant	Interim Storage 100 Miles Distant	Interim Storage 300 Miles Distant
Not shown (control)	3.42	3.49	4.13
Shown > 25 miles	3.71	3.97	4.30
Shown < 25 miles	4.34 (+.92)	4.12 (+.63)	4.22 (+.09)
Model <i>F</i> stat. sig.	<i>p</i> = 0.02	<i>p</i> = 0.09	Not Significant

Take-away points



- When informed, respondents indicate unease with current on-site temporary storage
- Modest support for interim storage facilities
- Centralized storage and disposal are both preferred to continued on-site storage.
- Proximity to existing and proposed facilities has complex effects, simple not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) effects misleading
 - Evidence that living near current SNF increases support for interim storage facilities
 - Proximity to new interim storage facilities may shift to support as impact on jobs and economy becomes known (as occurred at WIPP)



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
Implications of repository design in 2012

Design Factors	% Oppose	% Unsure	% Support	Means (1–7)	Change from Base Mean
Mine-Like Repositories	17	26	57	4.65 (Base)	N/A
With Research Lab	9	18	73	5.21	+12.0%
With Reprocessing	14	24	62	4.84	+4.1%
With Compensation	16	23	61	4.81	+3.4%

Value of waste retrievability in 2011

One option is to build facilities where the stored materials are continuously monitored and can be retrieved for reprocessing, or possibly to make them less dangerous using future technological developments. This option requires greater security efforts and may be more vulnerable to attack or theft.


Another option is to attempt to seal off storage sites in such a way that people cannot readily gain access to the materials in the future. This option is more secure, but does not allow reprocessing or treatment by future technological advancements.




Value of SNF reprocessing in 2011



Reprocessing involves the chemical separation of radioactive materials in spent nuclear fuel. After reprocessing, most of the uranium and plutonium can be captured and reused to generate electricity, reducing the amount of uranium that must be mined in the US or purchased from other countries. Some remaining materials are highly radioactive and must be safe-guarded and isolated from the environment for thousands of years. In addition, substantial quantities of medium and low level radioactive materials are created by reprocessing, and these too must be disposed of in a way that safeguards people and the environment. Finally, reprocessing may also separate the plutonium which, like uranium, could be used to make nuclear weapons.





Take-away points



- Facility design matters in US
- Implications of concept and design of repositories
 - Retrievability strongly favored
 - Mine-like facilities preferred over surface facilities or boreholes
 - Support for deep geologic repositories increases with...
 - Co-located research facilities
 - Reprocessing
 - Compensation positive but small




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Perceived Institutional Risk Bias







Find technically suitable sites first or communities volunteer first ?



- First make a *technical decision* that a particular site can be used to construct a safe and secure facility. This decision concerns such factors as the geologic, hydrologic, and population characteristics of the site (for example, avoiding earthquake-prone areas, flood zones, and densely populated areas). This decision is about technical requirements.
- First have *a potential host community invite* the siting of an interim storage facility. This decision concerns agreement by local residents and elected officials that technical experts can consider siting an interim storage facility nearby. This decision is about public support.

%	ALL	Oppose storage	Support storage	Ecologically Unconcerned	Ecologically Concerned	Reside < 25 Miles from SNF
First determine technical suitability of candidate sites (E50)	58	55	61	62	56	63
First have state & local communities decide whether they would like to host ISF	42	45	39	38	44	37



Who should be allowed to block/veto a siting decision for an interim storage facility?

A majority of citizens residing within 50 miles of the facilities (E64)	68
A majority of voters in the host state	68
Host state environmental protection agency or equivalent	53
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency	50
The governor of the host state	49
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission	44
U.S. Department of Energy	44
Leaders of the host state's legislature	34
U.S. Congressperson representing the host district	32
Either of the two U.S. Senators representing the host state	31
Nongovernmental environmental groups in the host state	21

Likely participation in policy process

If storage / transportation route for SNF was proposed within 50 miles of your residence, how likely is it that you would ...

Likelihood of Activities (1 = Not At All Likely—7 = Extremely Likely)	Interim Storage	Transportatio n Route
Attend informational meetings held by authorities	4.37	4.22
Write or phone your elected representatives (E78S/T)	4.20	4.24
Express your opinion using social media (E77S/T)	3.96	4.02
Serve on a citizens' advisory committee (E81S/T)	3.92	3.91
Help organize public <i>support</i> (E80S/T)	3.07	3.09
Help organize public <i>opposition</i> (E79S/T)	3.05	3.10
Speak at a public hearing in your area (E76S/T)	2.97	3.08

Means

Take-away points



- Trust is greatest, and perceived risk bias least, for the NAS, the national labs, and federal agencies.
- Public participation
 - Most said they would attending informational meetings for consideration of consolidated storage and associated transportation routes
 - Equal concern for transportation routes and facility
 - About 22% indicated willingness to join support or opposition groups



Comments and Questions?